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SECURITY INFORMATION

23 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. GEORGE MORGAN  
Psychological Strategy Board

SUBJECT : PSB D-24, dated 14 October 1952

Herewith are some of the comments with respect to subject paper:

1. Eliminate from the title, "with special reference to conflicts in the Politburo," since this is antedated by recent developments of the Congress in Moscow and, in addition, tends to make the paper too confining.
2. This program should not be limited merely to exploiting potential or existing conflicts in the Presidium but should be expanded to include conflicts within other power groups in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Orbit. There should be some general statement in the paper to highlight this factor.
3. A broad variety of indirect actions must be organized with the idea of creating situations capable of inducing divisive tensions at the top. Unless we can select our targets within areas that U. S. overt and covert capabilities can attain and effect, the entire plan will be nothing more than a pious declaration of intent. The primary targets, therefore, will have to be sought for at a much lower level; i.e., the power levers—the Party, some bureau of government (MGB), the military forces, and possibly, among the ethnic minority elements or the break-away of a satellite entity. Although it is a desirable objective to exploit or foment tensions within the Presidium prior to and subsequent to Stalin's death demise, it will have to come about as a result of creating situations which impel some form of counter action. Therein the conditions developed will lead to the strains in the hierarchy with respect to the approach or counters to be followed as the result of that specific issue's coming to a head.

4. The following

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4. The following factors ought to be taken into consideration in the paper:

a. Effect of the latest developments of the 19th Party Congress on the course of action outlined in the subject paper. Specifically, the following points should be considered:

(1) (1) Elimination of the Politburo and its replacement by the Presidium.

(2) Stalin's role in the new party and state structures.

(3) Any indication that the changes brought about by the 19th Party Congress have created machinery necessary for the gradual and orderly transition of power from Stalin to the new group or individual.

(4) Malenkov's role in the new power complex.

b. Examination of the other conflicts within the Soviet structure:

(1) The Military versus the political apparatus.

(2) Security apparatus versus the Military and the Political.

c. Although Stalin's eventual death can be regarded as a certainty, strains between the individuals and groups connected with the problem of succession should not be placed in the same category. We have no evidence that the existing "strains" between the individuals and groups are of such magnitude that they will culminate automatically in the internal conflict or lead to the inter-party struggle. Moreover, we should not assume that despite the existing rivalries, jealousies, etc., there may not be an orderly transition of power which would assure at least a short period of order and tranquility until the existing or created frictions would have sufficient time to fester. We must certainly assume that Stalin is fully aware of this instability and probably has devoted considerable time to making sure that his accomplishment will not be undermined by internal dissension. In such a case, it would be more

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profitable for us to advance our attack on two separate but related fronts. One attack directed to develop new and intensify old personal frictions among the top leadership; and another coordinated attack directed to place the military in opposition to the political apparatus.

It is the consensus that the paper as presently drawn assumes that the tensions and conflicts in the ruling clique exist. We must, instead, create conditions which will develop these tensions and conflicts. In short, the target selection needs to be broader and, at the same time, defined (see paragraph 3, above).

This effect would be to take action against the base of the pyramid, which is approachable, and work progressively toward the summit.

These are informal staff comments submitted with a view towards placing the paper in a more acceptable light and would be reflected in our briefing notes for the Director of Central Intelligence. If the paper stays in its present context, we would hope that it serve only as a terms of reference for attacking this problem and would not be binding on the type of planning which would ensue; i.e., accepting the top structure of the regime as the principal target.

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Special Assistant  
for Plans and Programs

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cc: CFP  
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